14/12 The Arab revolutions: Alain Baron: Difference between revisions
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These revolutions do not appear out of the blue or out of the Internet magic: <br>counter tendencies were already at work and accelerated during the last years.<br> | These revolutions do not appear out of the blue or out of the Internet magic: <br>counter tendencies were already at work and accelerated during the last years.<br> | ||
2. The revolutionary crises in Tunisia and in Egypt | ==2. The revolutionary crises in Tunisia and in Egypt== | ||
2.1. Global context of crisis of capitalism financial, economic and ecological crisis. | *2.1. Global context of crisis of capitalism financial, economic and ecological crisis. | ||
2.2. Crisis of the dominant oligarchies in power in Tunisia and in Egypt: “those from above can not rule anymore like before” | *2.2. Crisis of the dominant oligarchies in power in Tunisia and in Egypt: “those from above can not rule anymore like before” | ||
2.3. “Those from below don’t want to be rules like before anymore”: revolt of the youth, mobilisations by the workers and the “intermediary layers” | *2.3. “Those from below don’t want to be rules like before anymore”: revolt of the youth, mobilisations by the workers and the “intermediary layers” | ||
2.4. The major phases since January-February in both countries (rather long part) | *2.4. The major phases since January-February in both countries (rather long part) | ||
2.5. An unstable situation, globally the relationship of forces is maintained, the process started at the beginning of 2011 is not closed | *2.5. An unstable situation, globally the relationship of forces is maintained, the process started at the beginning of 2011 is not closed | ||
2.6. A chaotic dynamic of extension to the whole of the region | *2.6. A chaotic dynamic of extension to the whole of the region | ||
3. The limits of these processes | ==3. The limits of these processes== | ||
3.1. Weakness of self organisation | *3.1. Weakness of self organisation | ||
3.2. Absence of revolutionary mass party : a small and fragmented radical left | *3.2. Absence of revolutionary mass party : a small and fragmented radical left | ||
3.3. A difficult link between youth and organisations of adults | *3.3. A difficult link between youth and organisations of adults | ||
3.4. In Tunisia, a difficult link between the people of the most developed cities and the poor regions of the interior of the country | *3.4. In Tunisia, a difficult link between the people of the most developed cities and the poor regions of the interior of the country | ||
3.5. Le weight of decades of dictatorship | *3.5. Le weight of decades of dictatorship | ||
3.6. Mass islamist parties | *3.6. Mass islamist parties | ||
3.7. The essential parts of the previous State apparatus is kept in place | *3.7. The essential parts of the previous State apparatus is kept in place | ||
3.8. Capacity of the dominant classes and of imperialism to regain the initiative: | *3.8. Capacity of the dominant classes and of imperialism to regain the initiative: | ||
Tunisia: the High Council is installed, | *'''Tunisia''': | ||
**the High Council is installed, | |||
they use for their own agenda the popular demand for a constituent Assembly | |||
Egypt: referendum in February | **attacks against women’s rights | ||
*'''Egypt''': | |||
**referendum in February | |||
**legislation against the right to strike | |||
**attacks against freedom of speech | |||
**elections in November | |||
4. What Prospects? | ==4. What Prospects?== | ||
4.1. A break with capitalism and imperialism: on what conditions ( declaration of the Fourth International, interview Hamma Hammami …) | *4.1. A break with capitalism and imperialism: on what conditions ( declaration of the Fourth International, interview Hamma Hammami …) | ||
4.2. Towards a “democratisation at the level of the Maghreb-Machrek region”? (Gus) | *4.2. Towards a “democratisation at the level of the Maghreb-Machrek region”? (Gus) | ||
4.3. Towards the stabilisation of religious and conservative regimes? | *4.3. Towards the stabilisation of religious and conservative regimes? | ||
( the “Turkish model”)? | ( the “Turkish model”)? | ||
4.4. Towards totalitarian religious regimes? | *4.4. Towards totalitarian religious regimes? | ||
5. Build international solidarity | ==5. Build international solidarity== | ||
*Campaign against the debt | |||
*Support for mobilisations of workers, trade-unions, defence of women’s rights, | |||
mobilisations of the youth and for freedom | mobilisations of the youth and for freedom | ||
*Help with the building of a revolutionary vanguard |
Revision as of 13:10, 16 November 2011
Outline of lecture
1.Introduction: Revolutionary wave, double break with dominant discourse
- 1.1. Orientalist vision from colonial tradition:
“people from the Arab region doomed to authoritarianism and obscurantism” - 1.2. Dominant discourse since thirty years. “The end of history”: the will to prolong for eternity the period starting with the end of the seventies
These revolutions do not appear out of the blue or out of the Internet magic:
counter tendencies were already at work and accelerated during the last years.
2. The revolutionary crises in Tunisia and in Egypt
- 2.1. Global context of crisis of capitalism financial, economic and ecological crisis.
- 2.2. Crisis of the dominant oligarchies in power in Tunisia and in Egypt: “those from above can not rule anymore like before”
- 2.3. “Those from below don’t want to be rules like before anymore”: revolt of the youth, mobilisations by the workers and the “intermediary layers”
- 2.4. The major phases since January-February in both countries (rather long part)
- 2.5. An unstable situation, globally the relationship of forces is maintained, the process started at the beginning of 2011 is not closed
- 2.6. A chaotic dynamic of extension to the whole of the region
3. The limits of these processes
- 3.1. Weakness of self organisation
- 3.2. Absence of revolutionary mass party : a small and fragmented radical left
- 3.3. A difficult link between youth and organisations of adults
- 3.4. In Tunisia, a difficult link between the people of the most developed cities and the poor regions of the interior of the country
- 3.5. Le weight of decades of dictatorship
- 3.6. Mass islamist parties
- 3.7. The essential parts of the previous State apparatus is kept in place
- 3.8. Capacity of the dominant classes and of imperialism to regain the initiative:
- Tunisia:
- the High Council is installed,
they use for their own agenda the popular demand for a constituent Assembly
- attacks against women’s rights
- Egypt:
- referendum in February
- legislation against the right to strike
- attacks against freedom of speech
- elections in November
4. What Prospects?
- 4.1. A break with capitalism and imperialism: on what conditions ( declaration of the Fourth International, interview Hamma Hammami …)
- 4.2. Towards a “democratisation at the level of the Maghreb-Machrek region”? (Gus)
- 4.3. Towards the stabilisation of religious and conservative regimes?
( the “Turkish model”)?
- 4.4. Towards totalitarian religious regimes?
5. Build international solidarity
- Campaign against the debt
- Support for mobilisations of workers, trade-unions, defence of women’s rights,
mobilisations of the youth and for freedom
- Help with the building of a revolutionary vanguard