China's global role: challenging the US: Difference between revisions
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[https://4edu.info/images/a/a0/Chine-RapportIIRF1811126-Eng.ppt Powerpoint] | |||
Ecosocialist School 2018 - IIRE - November 26 | Ecosocialist School 2018 - IIRE - November 26 | ||
Xi Jinping, China's global role and global challenges | Xi Jinping, China's global role and global challenges | ||
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Introduction | Introduction | ||
The "over-determining" framework of the global situation: the global ecological crisis. | The "over-determining" framework of the global situation: the global ecological crisis. | ||
The "over-determining" framework of the global geopolitical situation: the global expansion of Chinese power | |||
The "over-determining" framework of the global geopolitical situation: the global expansion of Chinese power | |||
An uncertain future (consequences of a possible major regime crisis in China?). | An uncertain future (consequences of a possible major regime crisis in China?). | ||
Geopolitics today: the confrontation between the rising power (China) and the established power (United States). | Geopolitics today: the confrontation between the rising power (China) and the established power (United States). | ||
If the current dynamic continues: there is a tendency towards a radical change in the world order (reconstitution of two power-blocks operating according to different political and economic logics). | If the current dynamic continues: there is a tendency towards a radical change in the world order (reconstitution of two power-blocks operating according to different political and economic logics). | ||
Already, the "China factor" has implications for all domains. | Already, the "China factor" has implications for all domains. | ||
I. Xi Jinping's China | I. Xi Jinping's China | ||
Historical background: from China of Mao to the China of Deng to the China of Xi | Historical background: from China of Mao to the China of Deng to the China of Xi | ||
Processes: social revolution, bureaucratic counter-revolution as a precondition for bourgeois counter-revolution, political regime changes within capitalist China. | Processes: social revolution, bureaucratic counter-revolution as a precondition for bourgeois counter-revolution, political regime changes within capitalist China. | ||
1. A new, absolutist power structure. | 1. A new, absolutist power structure. | ||
2. A new state ideology that is both archaic (''red bloodlines'') and modern (the nationalism of a great power). | 2. A new state ideology that is both archaic (''red bloodlines'') and modern (the nationalism of a great power). | ||
3. A model of authoritarian (classic) capitalist development, based on a very specific social formation (which we know only imperfectly). | 3. A model of authoritarian (classic) capitalist development, based on a very specific social formation (which we know only imperfectly). | ||
3. A new global ambition. | 3. A new global ambition. | ||
=> The Chinese century = a rather classic imperialist project thought of as a global civilizational alternative. | => The Chinese century = a rather classic imperialist project thought of as a global civilizational alternative. | ||
The Achilles' heel: an impractical absolutist project? | The Achilles' heel: an impractical absolutist project? | ||
As long as there is hope for a better life... But when the crisis comes? | As long as there is hope for a better life... But when the crisis comes? | ||
II. Military expansion | II. Military expansion | ||
A purely imperialism? A contradiction in terms. | A purely imperialism? A contradiction in terms. | ||
The change in military doctrine. | The change in military doctrine. | ||
The development of naval forces | The development of naval forces | ||
The development of advanced weapons | The development of advanced weapons | ||
Cyber security | Cyber security | ||
The weaknesses of the Chinese armed forces and the defensive alliance with Russia. | The weaknesses of the Chinese armed forces and the defensive alliance with Russia. | ||
The Pentagon's concerns and the limits of the US superpower. | The Pentagon's concerns and the limits of the US superpower. | ||
The Trump factor, the European Union, Japan and Australia. | The Trump factor, the European Union, Japan and Australia. | ||
The situation in East Asia and the North Pacific. | The situation in East Asia and the North Pacific. | ||
Global deployment is taking shape. | Global deployment is taking shape. | ||
III. Economic expansion | III. Economic expansion | ||
Two steps. | Two steps. | ||
All-round expansion: "the belt and the road" (OBOR). | All-round expansion: "the belt and the road" (OBOR). | ||
Includes everything (cultural), but the pillar is: infrastructure. | Includes everything (cultural), but the pillar is: infrastructure. | ||
Multifunctional: opportunities for sectors suffering from overproduction, strategic investments (communications), political influence | |||
Multifunctional: opportunities for sectors suffering from overproduction, strategic investments (communications), political influence up to Latin America)... | |||
Financial institutions "in" (IMF) and "out" (AIIB) | Financial institutions "in" (IMF) and "out" (AIIB) | ||
The importance of "corridors" (Pakistan, Burma, Malaysia...). | The importance of "corridors" (Pakistan, Burma, Malaysia...). | ||
Debt as a weapon of domination (concessions: Sri Lanka). | Debt as a weapon of domination (concessions: Sri Lanka). | ||
Problem: profitability and political reactions (Malaysia, Africa...). | Problem: profitability and political reactions (Malaysia, Africa...). | ||
=> Reassessment in progress. | => Reassessment in progress. | ||
Economic expansion remains, but what about the OBOR program? | Economic expansion remains, but what about the OBOR program? | ||
The US counter-offensive | The US counter-offensive | ||
A very serious conflict on all fronts. | A very serious conflict on all fronts. | ||
The war over custom duties and foreign investment in China. | The war over custom duties and foreign investment in China. | ||
The currency war. | The currency war. | ||
The financing war ("development aid"). | The financing war ("development aid"). | ||
The technology war. | The technology war. | ||
Indispensable China. | Indispensable China. | ||
Debts in China? | Debts in China? | ||
IV Where are we going? | IV Where are we going? | ||
Obama and the price of paralysis (failure to refocus on the "Asian pivot"). | Obama and the price of paralysis (failure to refocus on the "Asian pivot"). | ||
Trump is the price of unilateralism (the loss of confidence of the allies). | Trump is the price of unilateralism (the loss of confidence of the allies). | ||
The "China factor" (Interpol, WHO, biodiversity...). | The "China factor" (Interpol, WHO, biodiversity...). | ||
The climatic coup de grâce. | The climatic coup de grâce. | ||
Solidarity and the new framework for internationalist action. | Solidarity and the new framework for internationalist action. | ||
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[http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article46516 Pierre Rousset: The inter-Korean summit and the situation in North-East Asia] (2018) | [http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article46516 Pierre Rousset: The inter-Korean summit and the situation in North-East Asia] (2018) | ||
[http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article42297 Au Loong-Yu: The 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party – Modernisation by a pre-modern bureaucracy?] (2017) | |||
Latest revision as of 09:37, 25 November 2018
Ecosocialist School 2018 - IIRE - November 26 Xi Jinping, China's global role and global challenges Pierre Rousset
Introduction
The "over-determining" framework of the global situation: the global ecological crisis.
The "over-determining" framework of the global geopolitical situation: the global expansion of Chinese power
An uncertain future (consequences of a possible major regime crisis in China?).
Geopolitics today: the confrontation between the rising power (China) and the established power (United States).
If the current dynamic continues: there is a tendency towards a radical change in the world order (reconstitution of two power-blocks operating according to different political and economic logics).
Already, the "China factor" has implications for all domains.
I. Xi Jinping's China
Historical background: from China of Mao to the China of Deng to the China of Xi
Processes: social revolution, bureaucratic counter-revolution as a precondition for bourgeois counter-revolution, political regime changes within capitalist China.
1. A new, absolutist power structure.
2. A new state ideology that is both archaic (red bloodlines) and modern (the nationalism of a great power).
3. A model of authoritarian (classic) capitalist development, based on a very specific social formation (which we know only imperfectly).
3. A new global ambition.
=> The Chinese century = a rather classic imperialist project thought of as a global civilizational alternative.
The Achilles' heel: an impractical absolutist project?
As long as there is hope for a better life... But when the crisis comes?
II. Military expansion
A purely imperialism? A contradiction in terms.
The change in military doctrine.
The development of naval forces
The development of advanced weapons
Cyber security
The weaknesses of the Chinese armed forces and the defensive alliance with Russia.
The Pentagon's concerns and the limits of the US superpower.
The Trump factor, the European Union, Japan and Australia.
The situation in East Asia and the North Pacific.
Global deployment is taking shape.
III. Economic expansion
Two steps.
All-round expansion: "the belt and the road" (OBOR).
Includes everything (cultural), but the pillar is: infrastructure.
Multifunctional: opportunities for sectors suffering from overproduction, strategic investments (communications), political influence up to Latin America)...
Financial institutions "in" (IMF) and "out" (AIIB)
The importance of "corridors" (Pakistan, Burma, Malaysia...).
Debt as a weapon of domination (concessions: Sri Lanka).
Problem: profitability and political reactions (Malaysia, Africa...).
=> Reassessment in progress.
Economic expansion remains, but what about the OBOR program?
The US counter-offensive
A very serious conflict on all fronts.
The war over custom duties and foreign investment in China.
The currency war.
The financing war ("development aid").
The technology war.
Indispensable China.
Debts in China?
IV Where are we going?
Obama and the price of paralysis (failure to refocus on the "Asian pivot").
Trump is the price of unilateralism (the loss of confidence of the allies).
The "China factor" (Interpol, WHO, biodiversity...).
The climatic coup de grâce.
Solidarity and the new framework for internationalist action.
Pierre Rousset: Chinese geopolitics: continuities, inflections, uncertainties (2018)
Pierre Rousset: The inter-Korean summit and the situation in North-East Asia (2018)